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INDEPENDENCE WITHIN HYUNDAI?
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1. INTRODUCTION
Something has changed about the way Korea's dmebolsl oper-
ate, particularly as it concerns that group of companies known as
the Hyundai Group.2 The change may be significant for foreign in-
stitutional investors, as it concerns the independence of the man-
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1 Chaebol: "A conglomerate of businesses, usually owned by a single family,
especially in Korea." AMERICAN HERrrAGE DICIONARY OF THE ENGuSH LANGUAGE
(4th ed. 2000). For a brief overview of the chaebol and a comparison to Japan's
keiretsu, see Country Briefing: South Korea: Economic Structure, EcoNo'MsT, July 17,
2001, at http://www.economistcom/countries/SouthKorea/profile.cfm?folder
=Profile%2DEconomic%20Structure/; Jean-Pierre Lehmann, Asian Perspectives on
Globalisation & Intra-Regional Dynamics (1998) (unpublished article, Swiss Asia
Foundation), at http://www.eviangroup.org/publications/pb15jl.htm/ (last
modified January 1998).
2 The Group, which had been Korea's largest according to some measures,
broke up in autumn 2000. Its car business separated in September, and its ship-
building and electronics businesses are scheduled to separate from the Group in
2001. This is happening because creditors want to save the strongest units from
collapse caused by the failure of other affiliates within the Group. See John Burton
& John Plender, Korea's Heavy Burden, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 7, 2000, at 28
[hereinafter Burton & Plender, Korea's Heavy Burden]; Samuel Len, Hyundai Moves
to Rescue Construction Unit, N.Y. TIms, Nov. 21, 2000, at W1; Cheong-mo Yoo,
Hyundai Announces W1.29 Trillion Self-Rescue Package, KOREA HERALD, Nov. 21,
2000, available at 2000 WL 27395311 [hereinafter Yoo, Hyundai Announces WI.291.
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agers of some of the companies that belong to the Hyundai Group.
Several of the Hyundai companies have recently refused to pro-
vide financial assistance to the ailing Hyundai Engineering and
Construction Company ("HEC"). Hyundai is one of the largest
chaebols, perhaps best known in the United States for its cars. It
also includes a large chipmaker (Hyundai Electronics Industries) 3
and the world's largest ship yard (Hyundai Heavy Industries).
Chung, Ju-Yung, whose sons now control the constituent compa-
nies, founded it some fifty years ago.
In this short piece, we will give a brief account, in Section 2, of
the background of the governance problem: the group chairman as
"puppet master," orchestrating the affairs of the group as a whole
without sufficient regard for the health of the individual compa-
nies within it, but focused instead on the size of the whole group.
We will then summarize in Section 3 the main point of the govern-
ance reforms, designed in large part to counterbalance the group
chairman with an active board of directors and with foreign insti-
tutional investors. The Hyundai case, discussed in Section 4, is a
prism through which one can try to assess the reforms and judge
whether they have been effective. We will ask in Section 5 whether
the reforms have worked.
2. THE GROUP CHAIRMAN AND THE GOVERNANCE REFORMS
HEC, the flagship company of the Hyundai Group, and an-
other prominent Korean company, Daewoo Motor, recently col-
lapsed under the weight of their debts. The Daewoo Group, placed
under a debt-restructuring program by its creditors in 1999 and in
formal receivership in November 2000, had been financially thin
for years and had amassed debts of $80 billion. One lesson to be
learned from Daewoo's experience is that weak members of a
group can drag down the whole group, because the member firms
are connected to each other by a web of cross ownership, cross
debt guarantees, and a substantial amount of intra-group trading.
This fact has been of paramount importance in the Hyundai
drama. The focus of this short essay is on HEC, one of the world's
largest construction companies, whose cash crunch became public
3 The fifty-third ordinary general meeting of shareholders changed the name
of the company to Hynix Semiconductor on March 29,2001.
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in May 2000 4 The immediate cause may have been HEC's pur-
chase of shares in other Hyundai Group members, to lower their
debt equity ratios and come into compliance with a government
mandate that requires members of the top thirty groups to lower
their ratios from an extremely high 500% to a merely over-
leveraged 200%.5 That reduction was one aspect of the govern-
ment orchestrated restructuring and corporate governance reform
of the chaebols, which followed their financial collapse in late 1997.6
The corporate governance reforms, which are discussed below, ap-
pear impressive on paper, but there are skeptics who doubt
whether the caebos-the family controlled groups of large pub-
licly traded companies and privately held firms, engaged in a wide
array of businesses and constituting the lion's share of the Korean
economy-have really changed the way they operate. Hyundai's
recent experience provides evidence to support both views.
4 John Burton, S Korea Tries to Calm Local Markets Amid Fears Over Hyundai's
Liquidity, FIN. Tu _s (London), May 29,2000, at 1.
5 Burton & Plender, Korea's Heavy Burden, supra note 2, at 28. That, coupled
with debts of $4.8 billion, attributed to a weak domestic market and losses on
overseas projects. Kim Eun-young, Hyundai Saga Signals Sweeping ahange, KO,%EA
ECON. WKLY. (Seoul), June 12, 2000 [hereinafter Kim, Hyundai Saga], available at
WISE D BASE, http://wvw.wisedb.co.kr/ (copy on file with author); Samuel
Len, Hyundai Group Founder to Sell 6.1% Stake in Auto Company, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
14, 2000, at C2; Jennifer Veale & John Burton, Creditors Lose Patience with Hyundai
Family Values, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 4, 2000, at 25 [hereinafter Veale & Bur-
ton, Creditors Lose Patience].
6 For fuller accounts of the corporate governance reforms, see OECD,
REGULATORY REFORM IN KOREA (2000), available at http://wivl.oecd.org
/publications/e-book/4200021e.pdf;, PETER M. BECK, KoREA EcoN. INST. OF AM.,
KoRE-A s [sIc] EmBATrLED CHAEBOt: ARE THEY SERIous Asour RFtrucr=iuNG?
(2000), at http://www.keia.com/chaebol2000.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2001); THE
Two KOREA [sic] IN 2000: SUSrAINNG [sic] EcovERY AND SEEKMNG Rco,'CiUA~iO.
(Korea Econ. InsL of Am. ed., 2000), available at http://-vwv.keia.com/mill-
fulldocumentpdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2001); Craig Ehrlich & Dae-Seob Kang
U.S. Style Corporate Governance in Korea's Largest Companies, 18 UCLA PAC. BAN
L.J. 1, (2000); Hwa-Jin Kim, Living With the IMF: A New Approad to Corporate Gov-
ernance and Regulation of Financial Institutions in Korea, 17 BERELE J. INT'L L 61,
70-81 (1999); Joon-gi Kim, Recent Amendments to tle Korean Commercial Code and
Their Effects on International Competition, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L 273, 274-77
(2000); II Chong Nam eL al., Corporate Governance in Korea, Presentation at
OECD Conference on Corporate Governance in Asia: A Comparative Perspective,
(Mar. 3-5, 1999), available at http://wvwv.oecd.org/pdf/M000015000
/M00015804.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2001); SAN-Woo NAM, KoEA's EcoNOMliC
CRISIS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANcE (Sch. of Pub. Policy and Mgm, Korean Dev.
Inst, Working Paper No. 99-02, 1999), available at http://w.nw.kdischool.ac.kr
/library/data/w99-0Zpdf.
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This essay is not a primer on the chaebols or the collapse of their
finances or the attempts to restructure and reform them. For that,
the reader may wish to review the sources cited in footnote six.
Our sense is that law by itself does not result in automatic change.
Law is not self-enforcing. Rather, Hyundai resisted the reforms.
Chung, Ju-Yung allocated control of the group companies in disre-
gard of corporate formalities. The Korean government, which has
tried to enforce the reforms, reversed course and abandoned a
fundamental principle of the reforms when it urged stronger
Hyundai firms to subsidize the failing HEC. In the end, the core
reform-the independence of the board of directors-seems to
have taken root at Hyundai, neither because of government en-
forcement nor because the Chung family at last "saw the light."
Change came because the capital markets forced it.
Prior to the governance reforms, it is likely that the office of the
group chairman 7 would have directed other group members to
extend support to the ailing affiliate in the form of equity invest-
ments, cheap loans, or transactions in goods or services on prefer-
ential terms. The International Herald Tribune's business writer
noted the practice of forced subsidization and its effect on portfolio
investors in April 1997, a half year before the crash:
Samsung Electronics Corp[oration], which like many other
subsidiaries of Korea's largest chaebol is publicly listed, is
one of the best semi conductor companies in the world, [a
fund manager] acknowledged. Many other Samsung enti-
ties are mediocre, however, so the benefits to investors in
Samsung Corp[oration] [the group parent] are diluted.
7 The group chairman's office had no legal basis in the Korean Commercial
Code but was the de facto mechanism through which the group chairman com-
municated his instructions to the various group companies, controlling them from
behind the scenes like a puppeteer. The office was staffed with between fifty and
100 people and made important decisions for the chaebol such as the appointment
of executives for its member companies, choosing new investment projects and
supplying money throughout the group. As the group chairman was neither a
director nor an officer of a company, he had no legal responsibility to the share-
holders. Hence, as part of its reforms, the government urged in February 1998
that the chairman's office be abolished. Kim Dae-Jung Sets Puppet Masters of Chae-
bol Packing, KOREA EcoN. WKLY. (Seoul), available at WISE D BASE,
http://www.wisedb.co.kr/ (copy on file with author), Feb. 23,1998; see also Tarun
Khanna & Krishna Palepu, The Right Way to Restructure Conglomerates in Emerging
Markets, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1999, at 125, 134. In many of the chaebols, it
was reinvented as a restructuring office.
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Even investors in the chip-making company get short-
changed, he said, because its profits "are used to subsidize
bad businesses, not shareholders in Samsung Electronics."s
Of the Hyundai Group, the Financial Times wrote in 1988:
It always manages, like most of the Korean cliaebol (con-
glomerates) to keep at least one "cash cow" in existence to
buttress other activities that might be in difficulty. At the
moment, in a group that has total sales of about $14 [bil-
lion], Hyundai Motors, the car company, is the "cash cow,"
while shipbuilding and construction barely break even.9
Eleven years later, the shipyard became a cash cow for Hyundai:
Being a cash cow of the cluebol is a heavy burden for the
world's largest shipyard, suggests economic researcher Yoo
Seong-min of the Korea Development Institute (KDI).
"HI [Hyundai Heavy Industries] has been making large
profits every year. But judging from its competence and
market position, it should be much more profitable than its
financial statements say;' he said. Yoo believes that HHI
has been subsidizing other branches of the Hyundai Group
and says HIll's large share of family ownership frees the
management from obligations to publicly justify its policy.10
When the finances of the claebols collapsed in late 1997, necessitat-
ing a massive International Monetary Fund ("IMF") bail out, the
new government of Kim Dae Jung adopted a five point plan of re-
form designed to make the cluaebols efficient, transparent and ra-
8 Conrad de Aenlle, South Korea's Industrial Giants Are Not Geared Toward In-
vestors, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 19,1997, at 19, available at 191997 WL 4490399.
9 The Newcomer Goes Into Overdrive, FIN. TIMES (London), June 30,1938, at 15.
Hyundai Elevator Company has also been called a cash cow for the Group as has
Hyundai Merchant Marine, Korea's biggest shipping company. John Burton, Last-
Ditch Rescue Plan Leaves the Investors Unimpressed, FiN. TIMES (London), Nov. 21,
2000, at 41 [hereinafter Burton, Last Ditc Rescue Plan]; Kim, Hyundai Saga, supra
note 5.
10 Hyundai Heavy Industries Seeks to Lower its Dependence on Shipbuilding,
KoREA HERALD, June 25,1999, available at 1999 WL 17750316.
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tional, and to fundamentally disengage the group members from
one another so that each would survive or fail on its own merits.
The plan was later expanded to include three additional points:
1. Business consolidation of the groups from sprawling col-
lections of unrelated businesses into areas of core compe-
tence,
2. Reduction of debt equity ratios,
3. Elimination of cross debt guarantees among group mem-
bers (given by one company in favor of the borrowings of
another),
4. Enhancement of management transparency by producing
consolidated balance sheets and income statements,
5. Reform of corporate governance so that managers would be
more accountable to shareholders and less so to controlling
group chairmen,
6. Reduction of, indirect cross ownership among group mem-
bers,
7. Prevention of transactions among group members that are
not arms length,
8. Prevention of evasion of inheritance and gift taxes when
control is passed from the chairmen to their sons."
3. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND FOREIGN INVESTORS
The chaebols had been over-leveraged and over-managed by
autocratic founders, group chairmen whose ambitions were simply
to be big and not necessarily profitable,12 and who were reluctant
11 Han-su Yu, Restructuring and Reorganization of Chaebol, Presentation at
Columbia University Symposium on The Korean Chaebol: Future Prospects and
Problems (Oct. 6, 2000); Phil-sang Lee, Economic Crisis and Chaebol Reform in
Korea, Presentation at Columbia University Symposium on The Korean Chaebol:
Future Prospects and Problems (Oct. 6,2000).
12 The point is made over and over again in the literature. See, e.g., Conrad de
Aenlle, supra note 8, at 19 ("The main complaint we would have with Korea is that
companies expand without fully considering profitability."). The chairman of Ko-
rea's Fair Trade Commission ("KFTC") stated in an address on October 23, 2000:
"Disregarding profitability, [the chaebol] engaged in reckless expansion through
leveraging. The will of the founding families of chaebol, rather than the market
and shareholders, played a decisive role in management decision-making."
Chairman Nam-kee Lee, Korea's Economy: Reform and Vision for the Future: Fo-
cused on Restructuring, Address before the Hong Kong General Chamber of
Commerce (Oct. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Nam-kee Lee, Korea's Economy], at
http://www.ftc.go.kr/ftclO/owa/emain/.
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to cede family control to outside equity or to professional manag-
ers. The reforms were intended, in part, to attract foreign equity
capital (institutional investors) to Korea's stock market and to the
chaebol firms. Korea's experience has something in common with
the general relationship between law and economic development
in the "Third World," moving from public ordering and state
planning to markets and private ordering as these governments
have come to see foreign investment not as a threat, but as a means
to obtain needed capital.' 3 Hence, instead of having state banks
funnel capital to the cluebol in accordance with a five-year plan
drawn by the Economic Planning Board, the new Korean model
calls for foreign portfolio investment to finance enterprises man-
aged by an active board of directors. For this to work, foreign fund
managers have to feel comfortable that their money will be used to
earn them a rate of return and that it will not be used by the group
chairman to support an affiliate. One means of providing that as-
surance is for the board of directors of the invested firm to be in-
dependent and not dominated by the chairman. 4 The Delaware
Supreme Court explained director independence in Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,816 (Del. 1984):
The requirement of director independence inhers [sic] in
the conception and rationale of the business judgment rule.
The presumption of propriety that flows from an exercise of
business judgment is based in part on this unyielding pre-
cept. Independence means that a director's decision is
based on the corporate merits of the subject before the
board rather than extraneous considerations or influences.
While directors may confer, debate, and resolve their dif-
ferences through compromise, or by reasonable reliance
upon the expertise of their colleagues and other qualified
persons, the end result, nonetheless, must be that each di-
13 See Jeswald W. Salacuse, From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: The
Legal Challenges of Ecotwmic Change, 1 INT'L & COMP. CORP. LJ. 277 (2000) (de-
scribing the common shift among Third World countries to a private development
model in recent decades).
14 See generally Carolyn Brancato & Michael Price, The Institutional Investor's
Goals for Corporate Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L 35,43 (2000)
("Investors want assurances that companies are professionally run and have re-
lied on the concept of 'independence' for boards of directors to provide this assur-
ance.").
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rector has brought his or her own informed business judg-
ment to bear with specificity upon the corporate merits of
the issues without regard for or succumbing to influences
which convert an otherwise valid business decision into a
faithless act.
Although foreigners now own about thirty percent of shares is-
sued by listed companies in Korea,15 they have also expressed their
lack of confidence that chaebol management groups will manage
their companies in the long-term interests of their shareholders.1 6
The Korean government responded in 1998, 1999, and 2000 by en-
acting a series of statutes and administrative rules designed to strip
unilateral power away from the group chairman;' 7 make the board
of directors an active;18 independent body;19 make group finances
transparent;20 and confer various rights and remedies upon minor-
15 Nam-kee Lee, Korea's Economy, supra note 12, at 5.
16 American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, Improving Korea's Business Cli-
mate 2001: Recommendations from American Business: Capital Markets, AMCHIAM
ISSUES (2001) [hereinafter AMCHAM, Capital Markets], at http://www
.amchamkorea.org/info/i-norm-issue8.htm/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2001).
17 The Korean Commercial Code Article 401-2 now provides that a control-
ling shareholder who has participated in the business of the company shall be
deemed a "de facto director." COMMERCIAL CODE [COM. CODE] art. 401-2 (S. Ko-
rea), translated in 4 STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 87-5 (Supp. 9) [hereinafter
KOREAN STATUTES].
18 The Korean Commercial Code Article 382-3 states that directors must per-
form their duties faithfully according to the law and the articles of incorporation,
and Article 393-2, Section 1 permits the board to establish committees. COM. CODE
arts. 382-3, 393-2(1) (1999) (S. Korea), translated in 4 KOREAN STATUTES, supra note
17, at 85 (Supp. 5).
19 A KSE listed company must have at least one quarter of its board filled by
outside directors; and a listed company with at least two trillion Won in assets,
must have at least one half outside directors. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE ACT, Act
No. 6176 of Jan. 21, 2000, art. 191-16(1) (S. Korea), translated in 11 KOREAN
STATUTES, supra note 17, at 749 (Supp. 9). The most recent version of Korea's Secu-
rities and Exchange Act can be found at http://www.moleg.go.kr/mlawinfo
/english/htms/html /lawl9.html (last modified July 20,2001).
20 For example, the thirty largest chaebol designated by the KFTC must issue
.combined" financial statements. ACT ON EXTERNAL AUDIT OF STOCK COMPANIES,
Act. No. 5497 of Jan. 8,1998, art. 1-3(1) (S. Korea), translated in 4 KOREAN STATUTES,
supra note 17, at 302 (Supp. 10). Also, large KSE listed companies, with assets in
excess of two trillion Won, must have an audit committee. SECURITIES &
EXCHANGE Acr, Act No. 6176 of Jan. 21, 2000, art. 191-17(1) (S. Korea) ("Any stock-
listed corporation prescribed by Presidential Decree shall establish an audit com-
mittee."), translated in 11 KOREAN STATUTES, supra note 17, at 749 (Supp. 9).
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ity shareholders.21 The Korean Fair Trade Commission ("KFYC")
has also attacked the chairman's control by probing wealth trans-
fers from chairmen to their sons 2 as well as internal transactions
among affiliates and by policing the elimination of cross debt
guarantees 24 and limits on investments in affiliates23 The corpo-
rate governance reforms can be summarized as falling into four
categories: (1) reforms that are intended to strengthen the inde-
pendence of the board of directors of the large publicly traded
firms;26 (2) reforms to the quality of accounting and auditing in Ko-
21 These rights, including access to basic corporate documents, to inspect
corporate affairs and property, to seek ouster of a director, to demand cessation of
an unlawful act, to commence derivative litigation, to request a meeting of share-
holders and propose an agenda for that meeting, and to enjoy the possibility of
cumulative voting, are fully described in Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 6, at 51-55.
22 See INHERITANCE TAX & GIFT TAX AcT, Act. No. 5193 of Dec. 30,1996 arts.
39, 39(1)2, & 40, Act. No. 6048 of Dec. 28, 1999, art. 41-3 (S. Korea) (describing a
transfer of shares from a large shareholder to a person who has a special relation-
ship with him as a donation), translated in 9 KOREAN STAT-TES, supra note 17, at
813-19 (Supp. 9). The KFTC policies have been stated in several speeches given by
the chairman and vice chairman of the KFTC. See, e.g., Chairman Yun-churl Jeon,
Korea's Corporate Restructuring and Competition Policy, Address at Georgetown
University (Sept. 10, 1999) (Yun-churl Jeon was Chairman of the M C until
August 2000), available at http://ftc.go.kr /data/hwp/staffl.htm (last visited Nov.
5, 2001); Nam-kee Lee, Korea's Economy, supra note 12; Vice-Chairman Nam-kee
Lee, Korea's Corporate Restructuring and Competition Policy, Address before the
America University School of Law (Feb. 22, 2000) (Nam-kee Lee became Chair-
man of the FTC when President Kim Dae-Jung reshuffled his cabinet in August
2000, and moved Yun-churl Jeon to Minster for Planning and Budget), available at
http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/new tl0.doc (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
23 See MONOPOLY REGULATION & FAIR TRADE AcT, Act No. 6043 of Dec. 28,
1999, art. 11-2(1) (S. Korea), translated in S KOREAN STATUTES, supra note 17, at 574-
75 (Supp. 10).
Any company belonging to an enterprise group falling under standards
prescribed by Presidential Decree from among large enterprise groups, if
such comany intends to carry out [a] trading act ... with specially-
related persons or for such specially-related persons ... , that company
shall publish such intention in advance after going through a resolution
of the board of directors.
Id.
24 See id. art. 10-2 & 10-2(1) ("A company ... shall not give debt guarantees to
domestic affiliated companies.").
25 See id. art. 10 & 10(1) ("Any company... belonging to a large enterprise
group shall be prohibited from acquiring or owning stocks of another domestic
company in excess of an amount deriving from the multiplication of its net asset
amount by 25/100 . .
26 See discussion supra note 19.
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rea;27 (3) enhancement of the rights of minority shareholders;28 and
(4) reforms intended to liberalize foreign portfolio and direct in-
vestment29 and thereby creating the possibility of a market for cor-
porate control and to facilitate merger and acquisition ("M&A")
transactions. Refinements to these reforms were recently enacted
by Korea's National Assembly, as described in the Appendix to
this essay.
Concerning the board of directors, the reforms amended the
Commercial Code by (i) declaring that directors must perform their
duties faithfully according to the law and the articles of incorpora-
tion (a fiduciary duty),30 and (ii) providing that a controlling
shareholder who has participated in the business of the company
shall be deemed a de facto director 3' (thereby holding the group
chairman legally accountable).32 The Securities and Exchange Act
was amended to require that a company listed on the Korea Stock
Exchange shall have at least one fourth of its board filled by out-
side directors, and a large listed company (with assets of at least
two trillion Won) must have a board with at least three outside di-
rectors and at least half the board must be outside directors. 33 For
27 See discussion supra note 20.
28 See discussion supra note 21.
29 Ceilings on foreign ownership of KSE listed and KOSDAQ registered firms
were nearly all abolished in May 1998. See SECURITIES & EXCHANGE Acr, Act. No.
Jan. 8, 1999, arts. 200 & 203 (S. Korea) (allowing Presidential Decree, an Enforce-
ment Decree or the Financial Services Commission to restrict foreign persons or
companies from acquiring securities), translated in 11 KOREAN STATUTES, supra note
17, at 753-56 (Supp. 5); ENFORCEMENT DECREE OF THE SECURITIES & EXCHANGE ACT,
Act. No. Feb. 24, 1998, art 87-2(2) (S. Korea) (allowing the Financial Supervisory
Commission to restrict foreign persons or companies from acquiring securities),
translated in 11 KOREAN STATUTES, supra note 17, at 899-18-19 (Supp. 10);
REGULATION ON SECURITIES BUSINESS SUPERVISION, art. 7-6 (S. Korea), available at
http://www.fsc.go.kr/laws/lawstockl-detail.asp?p-pageno=l&p-text=&p-seqn
o=3055&gubun=8&sub__title=&p-countyn=Y (last visted Nov. 17,2001).
A new streamlined foreign direct investment law, the Foreign Investment
Promotion Act was adopted in November 1998. FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROMOTION
ACT, Act. No. 5559 of Sept. 16, 1998 (S. Korea), translated at http://www.moleg
.go.kr/mlawinfo/english/htms/html/law03.html (last modified July 20, 2001),
amended by Act. No. 5982 of May 24, 1999, translated at http://www.mofe.go.kr
/mofe/kor/fdi/html/act.htm (last modified June 28, 2000). See Ehrlich & Kang
supra, note 6, at 57- 58.
30 CoM. CODE, supra note 18, art. 382-3 (S. Korea)
31 COM. CODE, supra note 17, art. 401-2 (S. Korea).
32 See supra note 7.
33 SECURITIES & EXCHANGE Acr, supra note 19, art. 191-16 (S. Korea).
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example, half of the HEC directors are outside directors, as are four
of seven of Hyundai Electronics Industries' directors, five of nine
of Hyundai Heavy Industries' directors, and half of Hyundai Mo-
tor Company's directors34 Such large listed companies must also
have a nominating committee, and at least half of their members
must be outside directors. Also, several new disclosure rules were
put in effect. The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act re-
quires the board of directors to approve certain "large-scale inter-
nal trading," and for the approval to be publicly disclosed.33 This
provision applies to the thirty largest chaebols.36 The Korea Stock
Exchange now requires listed companies to disclose certain resolu-
tions of the board of directors,37 and both KSE listed and KOSDAQ
(Korea's equivalent of NASDAQ) registered firms are required to
disclose in their periodic reports information concerning the com-
position of their board of directors, board committees and minority
shareholder rights.-I
Have these "board-energizing" measures worked? Many ob-
servers believe that the cluebols are biding their time, for example,
by installing directors who appear to be independent of the chair-
man but in fact are not. Governments change but the fact that
chaebols endure is one way that this is expressed. The new reality,
34 This is according to the third quarter report of each company filed with the
Financial Supervisory Commission on November 14, 2000. The report is available
in Korean from the Financial Supervisory Service database at http://dartfss.or.kr.
35 MONOPOLY REGULATION & FAIR TRADE AcT, supra note 23, art. 11-2 (S. Ko-
rea). See Notification on the Resolution of the Board of Directors and Public Dis-
closure with Regard to Large-Scale Intra-Group Transactions, Fair Trade Commis-
sion Notification No. 2000-2 (Apr. 1, 2000) (notifying "the provisions on the
resolution of the board of directors and public disclosure with regard to large-
scale intra-group transactions pursuant to Article 11-2 of the Monopoly Regula-
tion and Fair Trade Act"), at http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/G0033.doc (last visited
Nov. 17, 2001).
36 Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation & Fair Trade Act, Presi-
dential Decree No. 17176 of Mar. 27, 2001, art. 17-3(1) (S. Korea), trims1afed at
http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/edomraftc17176.doc (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
37 KOREAN STocK EXCHANGE, Disclosure Regulation for Listed Companies,
arts. 4 & 22-3 (Aug. 17, 2001), translated at http://wivw.google.com/search
?q=cache.yaG3haLdMOQ:www.kse.or.kr/upload/rule/regOOl.doc (last modified
Aug. 17, 2001).
38 See SEcuRmEs & EXCHANGE Acr, Act. No. 6176 of Jan. 23, 2001, arts. 186 &
186-2 (S. Korea), translated in 11 KOREAN STATUTES, supra note 17, at 727-30 (Supp.
9); REGULATION ON SECURITIES ISSUANCE & DISCLOSURE, arL 72 (S. Korea), at
http://wvv.fsc.go.kr/laws/lawstockl-detail.asp?p-pageno=l&p-text-&ppseqn
o=3050&gubun=8&sub title=&pcountyn=Y (last visted Nov. 17,2001).
2001]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
though, is that the chaebols must attract foreign capital. They can
no longer depend on having government directed funds funneled
to them through Korean banks on easy terms. Thus, apart from the
force of the law and of the ongoing FTC audits, the force of private
capital in the hands of foreign fund managers may change the way
that the chaebols operate. That may explain why-as noted be-
low-other Hyundai firms have been slow in coming to the aid of
HEC. It is not quite clear why HEC is being left to go it alone, or
indeed whether this is the case, because the news reports are at
times incomplete and inconsistent. It may be that the affiliates now
have independent management, that foreign institutional investors
now have a voice, or that there is a simmering family feud amongst
the founder's sons who control various pieces of the Group.
Clearly, though, the landscape does appear to have become ready
for less autocratic rule and for more rational checks and balances in
corporate governance. The old days of founders behaving like
lords in a fiefdom are eroding quickly. In the early 1990s, group
chairman Lee Keun Hee of Samsung famously pushed through by
brute force an irrational plan to build a new automobile division at
a time when there was over expansion and excess capacity
throughout Asia. It is difficult to believe that he could do so to-
day.39
4. THE HYUNDAI CASE
The Hyundai Group traces its roots to 1950 when its first com-
pany, HEC, was established by Chung Ju-Yung. 40 Other group
members include Hyundai Motor Company and Kia Motors Cor-
poration, Hyundai Heavy Industries, and Hyundai Electronics In-
dustries (a chip maker).41 In mid-2000, the Group had fifty-three or
so companies, down from a high of eighty-nine a few years ear-
lier.42 In mid-2000, Chung stepped down as Group chairman fol-
lowing repeated demands by unhappy bank creditors and the gov-
39 For this insight, we thank Jeong-ho Roh of Columbia University Law
School.
40 Burton & Plender, Korea's Heavy Burden, supra note 2, at 28. Mr. Chung
passed away in March 2001.
41 For a list of the Group's companies, see Hyundai, Company,
http://www.hyundai.com/hd2OO0/subcompanies.htm (last visited Oct. 31,
2001).
42 Veale & Burton, Creditors Lose Patience, supra note 5, at 25.
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ennent to do so.43 He installed three of his sons in his place
(though an outside observer may wonder about the disregard of
corporate formality in summarily appointing one's son to a post
with great influence): Chung Mong Joon was given control of the
shipyard, Hyundai Heavy Industries. Chung Mong Hun was
placed in charge of HEC and many other Group companies.
Chung Mong Koo became chairman of the Hyundai Motor group,
which includes Hyundai Motor, Kia Motors, and several other
companies. The Hyundai Motor group separated from the Hyun-
dai Group in September 2000. The idea at the time was that
Hyundai Motor would no longer have to give financial support to
the larger Group's ailing businesses. 44
The succession was not a happy one. Mong Hun was said to be
Chung Ju-Yung's favorite son and his accession to the flagship
HEC, the high-tech jewel of Hyundai Electronics and the finance
operations of Hyundai Securities, reportedly angered his broth-
ers. 45 The battle for group control became public in the spring of
2000 when on March 10, Mong Hun was ousted from the board of
43 Hyundai was unattractive to foreign investors following a power struggle
among Mr. Chung's sons. The Group was in a liquidity squeeze. Creditors had
demanded that Mr. Chung and his sons give up management rights. Investors
were dumping Hyundai stock. And so the founder/chairman announced his re-
tirement on May 31, 2000. John Burton, Founder's Iron Grip Seen as Obstacle to
Hyundai Reform: Creditors Do Not Share Public's Opinion of Group Patnarch, FIN.
TIMES (London), May 29, 2000, at 22; Moon Ihiwan, l.Wren Is Hyundai Going to Get
It?, Bus. WK., June 12, 2000, at 66; Kim, Hyundai Saga, supra note 5; Hyundai at the
Height of Liquidity Problem, KoREA EcoN. WKLy. (Seoul), June 5, 2000, available at
WISE D BASE, http://wvw.wisedb.co.kr/ (copy on file with author); Laxmi Na-
karmi, Of Father and Sons: Family Ties, Money Troubles, Politics and Old-Fashioned
Ambition Cloud Hyundai's Future, ASIAWEEK, June 16, 2000, at 58; Ken Symon, Re-
volt at Hyundai as Founder's Son Refuses to Retire, THE ScOTS.AN, June 2, 2000, avrm1-
able at 2000 WL 21312768; Veale & Burton, Creditors Lose Patience, supra note 5, at
25. He also instructed his sons to retire. Mong Hun stepped down from Hyundai
Electronics and even from HEC, but formally resumed his posts by November.
Even during the interregnum, he was regarded as the key to the restructuring of
HEC. Mong Koo explicitly refused to step down from Hyundai Motor.
44 John Burton, Hyundai Motor Goes It Alone, FN. TLIMs (London), Sept. 1,
2000, at 25.
45 See, e.g., Czung to Dry, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 13, 2000, at 19 CaMong-
hun's apparent good fortune provoked jealousy among his two brothers, who
were assigned by their father to run smokestock industries like cars and ship-
building."); John Burton, Plan to Save Hyundai Unit Delayed, FIN. TI.iES (London),
Nov. 16, 2000, at 43 [hereinafter Burton, Plan to Save] ("Chung Mong-hun's two
estranged brothers own Hyundai Motor and Hyundai Heavy Industries"); Bur-
ton, Last-Ditch Rescue Plan, supra note 9, at 41 ("Mr. Chung's brothers ... are still
bitter about a power struggle for group leadership early this year.").
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Hyundai Motor Company Mong Koo was, and is, its representa-
tive director46 and chairman. In mid-March, Mong Koo and Mong
Hun fought over control of the Group's financial sector, with each
naming his own loyalist as chairman of Hyundai Securities Com-
pany. On March 24, the Hyundai Group Corporate Restructuring
Committee (essentially, a reincarnation of the office of the group
chairman) announced that Mong Hun would henceforth be the
sole chairman of the Hyundai Group CEO's Council-the de facto
Group chairman. Mong Koo publicly refused to accept this deci-
sion, but on March 27, Chung Ju-Yung personally reaffirmed Mong
Hun as the Group's sole chairman. This peremptory anointment is
one of the reasons for the further corporate governance reforms
described in the Appendix hereto.
The Korean government, which has been highly interventionist
in the past, now accepts the virtues of a market-based economy
and a market-led restructuring of the chaebols. The Ministry of Fi-
nance and Economy states its policy this way: "By the end of 2001,
we will attempt to reform the inappropriate behavior and practices
of economic agents to encourage elevated acceptance of market
principles."47 The government initially took a hands-off attitude
towards the fate of HEC. The stock market disfavored Hyundai in
the wake of the family infighting, leading a securities analyst in
Seoul to state, "[T]hese forces will gradually force the group to
separate companies and restructure weak affiliates." 48 Neverthe-
less, when Daewoo was placed in formal receivership, there came a
sense of urgency about HEC. True, the state banks, which are
HEC's biggest creditors, did not seek formal receivership for it, and
they agreed in early November 2000 to roll over some debts.
However, executives of various Hyundai affiliates rejected the self-
rescue plan proposed by the Chung family. This was a new phe-
nomenon: a group company behaving independently. The fam-
ily's restructuring plan included a proposal that Hyundai Mer-
chant Marine, a large shipping company, sell its stakes in
46 A representative director -an office unknown in the U.S. business corpo-
ration but common in civil law jurisdictions -is elected by the board of directors
and has the authority to represent the company. COM. CODE, supra note 18, art.
389.
47 Jin Nyum, Ministry of Fin. and Econ., Second-Half Economic Policy Directives
of the Kim Dae-jung Administration: Aug. 2000 - Feb. 2003 (2000), at http://www
.mofe.go.kr/cgi-pub/content.cgicode=e.ep&no=74 (last visited Nov. 17,2001).
48 Veale & Burton, Creditors Lose Patience, supra note 5, at 25 (quoting Namuh
Rhee, Head of Research at Samsung Securities in Seoul).
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Electronics and Heavy Industries (the cross-ownership being char-
acteristic of the chaebols and one means by which the group chair-
man is able to have effective control of the group) and use the pro-
ceeds for the benefit of HEC. Merchant Marine executives refused,
saying that the proposed sale would hurt their own finances4 9
Hyundai Electronics also turned down Mong Hun's requests for
cash infusions into the construction unit. Chief executives of other
Hyundai companies even failed to show up at a Chung-presided
meeting to discuss measures to rescue HEC.? This cannot be ex-
plained as fallout from the dispute among the brothers, as Mer-
chant Marine, Electronics, and HEC are all within Mong Hun's
realm. Motor and Heavy Industries, controlled by Mong Hun's
estranged brothers, said they had little interest in purchasing
Hyundai assets.5'
The Korean government then spoke up. On November 5, the
Minister of Finance and Economy said that Hyundai's affiliates
should extend support 2 In a controversial departure from previ-
ous pledges to abide by market principles, the reform watchdog
Financial Supervisory Commission ("FSC") arranged a bridge loan
in mid-November by forcing the state-run Korea Land Corporation
to advance almost $200 million to Hyundai against the sale of a
very large parcel of land owned by Chung Ju-Yung. 3 The Korean
president also appealed to the Sultan of Brunei to speed the pay-
ment on a Hyundai construction project, and the finance minister
said that the collapse of HEC would cause economic problems for
the nation.5 4 The government was concerned about massive job
losses at the same time that Daewoo Motors was collapsing, and in
a dramatic reversal of policy against cross-subsidization, it pressed
49 Burton, Plan to Save, supra note 45, at 43; Hyundai Owner Facing Il ced to
Separate HEI, KoREA HERALD, Nov. 8,2000, available at 2000 WL 27394633.
m Yoo Cheong-Mo, Chung's Bid to Bail Out Hyundai Construction Runs into
Troubles, KOREA HERALD, Nov. 10, 2000, available at 2000 WVL 27394753.
51 John Burton, Pressure Mounts on Hyundai Restructuring, Fix. TIMEts (Lon-
don), Nov. 18, 2000, at 21 [hereinafter Burton, Pressure Mounts]; Burton, Plan to
Save, supra note 45, at 43.
52 Yoo Cheong-mo, Brother Groups Turn Cold Shoulder to Troubled Hyundai
Construction, KOREA HERALD, Nov. 7,2000, available at 2000 WL 27395876.
53 Yoo Cheong-mo, Policy Toward Hyundai Weakening Confidence, KoLEA
HERALD, Nov. 17, 2000 [hereinafter Yoo, Policy Toward Hyundai], available at 2000
WL 27395627.
54 John Burton, Hyundai in Struggle to Save Building Unit, FIN. TL Ms (London),
Nov. 15,2000, at 19.
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Hyundai Motors and Heavy Industries to support HEC.55 The FSC
chairman met with Mong Koo to ask him to help HEC and ar-
ranged a dramatic reconciliation on November 16 between Mong
Hun and Chung Mong Koo.56 Motors now decided to buy some of
HEC's assets.57 Notable among the assets offered for sale was
some portion of HEC's headquarters building in downtown Seoul,
which most of HEC's affiliates had refused to buy.58 Hyundai
Motors, however, pledged some $195 million in financial support
following the reconciliation between Mong Hun and Mong Koo.59
The attitude of Heavy Industries was not as clear. Some reports
had it promising support along with Hyundai Motors, 60 others had
it refusing to join in the purchase of the headquarters building,61
being dissuaded by minority shareholders. 62 Its spokesman said
that HHI was already inundated with protest calls from foreign
shareholders angry over the possible irregular cash aid to HEC.
He added that the management was under pressure from local mi-
nority shareholder activists.63
Hyundai Merchant Marine and Hyundai Elevator may also
have agreed to participate in the purchase,64 though Marine later
rejected the proposal.65 Electronics America clearly refused to par-
ticipate in the bailout, citing its managerial independence. The
55 Burton, Pressure Mounts, supra note 51, at 21; Burton, Last-Ditch Rescue Plan,
supra note 8, at 41.
56 Yoo, Policy Toward Hyundai, supra note 55, available at 2000 WL 27395627.
57 Burton, Last-Ditch Rescue Plan, supra note 9, at 41.
58 Yoo, Hyundai Announces M1.29, supra note 2, available at 2000 WL 27395311.
59 Hyundai Faces Hurdle in Securing Rescue Plan, KOREA TIMES (Seoul), Nov. 21,
2000, available at 2000 WL 24666091; Yoo, Hyundai Announces W.29, supra note 2,
available at 2000 WL 27395311.
60 Gov't Tells Hyundai Not to Count on Fresh Funds, KOREA TIMES (Seoul), Nov.
21, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24666094.
61 Market Skeptical Over Hyundai Construction's Self-Rescue Plan, KOREA TIMES
(Seoul), November 21, 2000, at 2000 WL 24666086; Hyundai Faces Hurdle in Securing
Rescue Plan, supra note 59, at 2000 WL 24666091.
62 Yoo Cheong-Mo, Hyundai Construction's Bailout Plan Unrealistic, Foreign
Analysts Say, KOREA HERALD, Nov. 23, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27395374 [herein-
after Yoo, Hyundai Construction's].
63 Yoo Cheong-Mo, Hyundai's Self-Rescue Bid Runs into Last-Stage Trouble: At-
tempt to Sell Group Building Goes Nowhere, KOREA HERALD, Nov. 18, 2000, available
at 2001 WL 27048995.
64 Market Skeptical over Hyundai Construction's Self-Rescue Plan, Korea Times
(Seoul), Nov. 21, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24666086.
65 Yoo, Hyundai Construction's, supra note 62, available at 2000 WL 27395374.
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chairman of Electronics America, who is not a Chung, said that
"we have been reinventing ourselves, . . . we have built a
firewall."66 Hyundai Motor, having been encouraged by the gov-
ernment to extend support to HEC, did not back away.b7
Following the death of Chung Ju-Yung in March 2001, it is
more likely than ever that the Hyundai Group will be formally
split into separate, independent and much smaller groups.63
5. CONCLUSIONS
What, if anything, can one conclude from these facts? Director
independence was a cornerstone of Korea's corporate government
reforms. Do any of the Hyundai Group affiliates have an inde-
pendent board of directors that is not in fact dominated by the
Chung family? We set aside for the moment the question of
whether any chaebol board is independent of pressure from the Ko-
rean government. Group chairman Chung Ju-Yung was ousted by
combined pressure from the government, creditors and unhappy
investors, and while that is certainly a new thing, family control
has largely continued through his sons. Hyundai Motor at first re-
fused to help HEC, and that was also new, though that was proba-
bly more for personal reasons than sound business judgment. The
Korean government is still trying to engineer the economy by
managing the affairs of Korean companies, and there is nothing
new about that. Finally, some affiliates, notably Electronics, Elec-
tronics America, Merchant Marine, and HHI have simply refused
to assist HEC out of concern for their own financial health 69 their
66 Don Kirk, Creditor Hails Lastest [sic] Plan by Hyiindat: Analysts Remain Skep-
tical of Unit's Self-Rescue Effort, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 21, 2000, at 15 (quoting
Park Chong Sup).
67 Michael Baker, l,1zy Start-Ups Tl're S. Koran Economy's FalsE Hope,
CHRISTIAN Sci. MoTrrOR, Dec. 8, 2000, at 7; Yoo, Hympdla Consfirchion's, supra note
62, available at 2000 WI. 27395374.
63 See, e.g., Yoo Cheong-Mo, Hyundai Group Exrpctcd to Split into Three Top-10
Groups by Year's End, KOREA HERALD, Mar. 24, 2001, azatlable at 2000 WL 8117042;
Don Kirk, As Korean Heirs Feud, an Empire Is I'itker-mg, N.Y. TIv.Es, Apr. 26, 2001,
at C1.
69 Electronics, for example, is reported to have suffered a $1.8 billion operat-
ing loss in 2000, due in part to slowing DRAM sales and debt incurred to finance
the acquisition of LG Semiconductor as part of a government orchestrated re-
structuring of the daebols. Drew Wilson, SOS from Hyjunda: The World's Numer
Two DRAM Maker Is Fighting for Survival, ELECTRONIc Bus. a.lIA, Apr. 2001, at
http://www.eb-asia.com/registrd/issues/0104/0104eb.htm/. Another report
notes liquidity problems at Hyundai Securities, Hyundai Merchant Marine, and
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independence, and their minority shareholders, and that is a dra-
matically new thing worth our notice given the size of Hyundai
and the importance of Korea in the global economy.
The new and pending corporate governance reforms described
in this Essay are evolutionary, not revolutionary. They fill gaps left
by the previous reforms. Some extend the requirement that boards
have outside directors. For example, Item 6 of the Securities and
Exchange Act amendments requires outside directors at KOSDAQ
registered firms. This had been required only at firms listed on the
Korea Stock Exchange.70 Other amendments concern the rights of
minority shareholders and the mechanism to enforce those rights.
Item 5 of the Commercial Code amendments provides for reim-
bursement of costs incurred by a shareholder in prosecuting a de-
rivative suit.7' Item 4 of the Securities and Exchange Act amend-
ments lowers the ownership threshold required to exercise certain
rights.72 Significantly, however, Korea does not allow class action
lawsuits, and the amendments fail to create this procedural device,
which is a practical necessity in bringing securities fraud cases.
Korea has traditionally not been a litigious society. It is uncertain
whether opening the doors to the courthouse, however imper-
fectly, means that anyone will walk through them.7 There have
been only a few derivative suits in Korea. Recently, a group of for-
eign institutional investors sued the directors of Samsung Elec-
tronics for its decision to pay the debt of Samsung Motors.74 But
while litigation remedies may deter blatant disloyalty, they evi-
dently do not help a board make wise decisions. One wonders
why the HEC affiliates have been able to resist doing the sort of
Hyundai Petrochemical. Yoo Cheong-mo, Financial Woes Speeding up Breaktp of
Hyundai Group, KOREA HERALD, Mar. 31, 2001, available at 2000 WL 8117346.
70 See SEcuarrIES & EXCHANGE Acr, supra note 19, art. 191-16 (S. Korea)
("Stock-listed corporations must make outside directors no less than one fourth of
the total number of directors .... .
71 See COM. CODE, supra note 17, art. 405(1) (S. Korea).
72 See SECURITIES & EXCHANGE ACT, Act No. 5736 of Feb. 1,1999, art. 191-13(2)
& (3) (S. Korea) (requiring 50/10,000 or more, or in the case of a corporation as
prescribed by Presidential decree of 25/10,000 of the total shares to exercise the
stockholder's rights), translated in 11 KOREAN STATUTES 746-47 (Supp. 9).
73 Perhaps Japan is a good example. A recent story in the Economist describes
.a small boom in lawsuits" since governance reforms made suits cheaper. Japan's
Corporate-Governance U-Turn, ECONOMIST, Nov. 24,2000, at 73.
74 Yoo Cheong-mo, Foreign Investors Take Legal Action Against Samsung Direc-
tors, KOREA HERALD, Nov. 24,2000, available at 2000 WL 27395450.
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thing that provoked litigation against the board of Samsung Elec-
tronics. To the extent that the law requires outside directors, audit
and nominating committees, etc., all the clhebol firms have com-
plied, so, this cannot be the explanation. Look again at Samsung:
there was a bribery scandal last summer. Samsung Electronics
gave $1.5 million in company stock to one of its outside directors. 5
Corruption is the negation of independence. It remains a serious
problem in Korea, and one that is not limited to the governance of
the chaebols.76 That is one reason why institutional investors view
the Korean market as a short-term investment and why there is
still little pension fund money being invested there. 77 The new
laws certainly provide a framework, a guide, for a company that is
serious about getting it right. But true change comes only with cri-
sis, when the forces of the capital markets hit hard. That may be
the real lesson of Hyundai.
APPENDIX
The corporate governance legal reforms enacted to date are de-
scribed in detail in the sources cited in footnote 5, above. Addi-
tional reforms were enacted in 2001. They concern amendments to
Korea's Commercial Code, the source of basic corporation law, the
Securities Exchange Act, which regulates publicly traded corpora-
tions and the External Audit Law, which regulates the auditing of
publicly traded firms, among others.
The Corporate Governance Reform Project, financed by the
Ministry of Justice, with technical assistance loan funds from the
World Bank, brought together a team of lawyers and legal profes-
sors from the United States and Korea. The team began its work in
1999. Its goal was to make specific suggestions to the Commercial
Code and to map out both short-term and long-term directions for
reform. The final report of their recommendations ("Final Report
and Legal Reform Recommendations") was delivered to the Min-
istry of Justice in June 2000. The report focused on three key areas:
75 Yoo Cheong-mo, Bribery Scandal Deepens Investor Distrust of Samsung Elec-
tronics, KOREA HERALD, Aug. 26,2000, available at 2000 1,L 21234877.
76 Foreign executives and the local Seoul business community alike cite cor-
ruption as impeding their business activities. Chon Shi-yong, Kim Orders 'Extraor-
dinary' Steps on Corruption to Boost Foreign Investors, KoREA HERALD, Jan. 10, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 8113857; Kim Hyung-jin, Businesses See Assembly as Most Cor-
rupt, KOREA HERALD, Feb. 17, 2001, available at 2001 WL 8115533.
77 AMCHAM, Capital Markets, supra note 16.
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beefing up the role of the board of directors in Korean firms; end-
ing intra-group transactions which decrease value for sharehold-
ers; and defining more clearly the roles of government, shareholder
litigation and market forces in enforcing shareholder rights. A
public hearing for amendment of the Commercial Code was held
on October 11, 2000. The main issues addressed by the hearing
broadly included: (a) strengthening the role of directors; (b) ex-
panding minority shareholder rights; (c) boosting pre-emptive
rights; and (d) improving the monitoring of related party transac-
tions. The draft bill was submitted to the National Assembly on
December 30, 2000.78 The Assembly passed a modified version on
June 28, 2001. The Act for Amendment of the Commercial Code
was promulgated on July 24, 2001 and made effective on that date.
1. Revised Commercial Code of 200179
1.1. Enlarging the Authority of the General Meeting of
Shareholders:
A resolution in accordance with art[ide] 434 (a special
resolution of the general meeting) shall be required for a
company to effect the following acts:
1.- 3. (omitted).
4. The takeover of a part of the business of other com-
pany, which may have an important effect on the busi-
ness of the company.8 0
78 A Korean language version of the drafted bill, No. 160586, submitted to the
National Assembly is available at http://na6500.assembly.go.kr/cgi-bin/detail
?BILLNO=160586 (last visited Nov. 17,2001).
79 See Law No. 14858 of July 24, 2001, Gwanbo (the Official Gazette) No.
14858, available at http://open.korea.go.kr/gwanbodata/2001/07/0724000000pdf
(specifying the changes made to Law No. 6068 of Dec. 31,1999).
80 Art. 374 (1)(4), newly inserted.
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Under the existing law, a special resolution of the general
meeting is not required for the corporation to effect the takeover of
a part of the business of another company.
1.2. Director's Duty of Keeping a Secret:
Directors shall keep a managerial secret acquired in the per-
formance of his duties after his retirement from office as
well as during his office.8
1.3. Specifying Actions that Shall Require the Approval of the Board
of Directors:
The management of corporation affairs such as "the dis-
posal and transfer of important assets, borrowing a large
property," appointment or dismissal of managers and es-
tablishment, transfer or abolition of branch offices shall be
made by the resolution of the board of directors.P
This new article clarifies that the management of corporation
affairs belongs to the authority of the board of directors and that
the disposal and transfer of important assets, borrowing a large
property, etc., are examples of the management of corporation af-
fairs.
The existing article reads: "Management of [corporation] af-
fairs, appointments or dismissal of managers and establishment,
transfer or abolition of branch offices shall be made by the resolu-
tion of the board of directors."83
81 Art 382-4, newly inserted.
87 ArL 393 (1), amended.
8 Law No. 6086 of Dec. 31,1999, art 393(1) (amended 2001).
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1.4. Director's Right to Have Greater Access to the Corporate
Infornation:
Directors may demand the representative director to report
on the functions of other director or employees to the board
of directors.8
Directors shall report the conditions of the management of
affairs to the board of directors at least once every three
months. 5
1.5. Expanding Minority Shareholders' Rights (Refunding Legal
Costs Incurred in Derivative Suit):
If the shareholder, who has filed a derivative suit in accordance
with article 403(3) and (4), wins the case, he may demand reim-
bursement by the company for a reasonable amount "of litigation
costs and other expenses" incurred by the suit. "The corporation
who has paid the litigation costs may demand the director to reim-
burse the cost."86
Under existing law, a limited refund on legal costs is made in
the event of a victory. Namely, the shareholder who has won the
case may demand the reimbursement by the corporation for a rea-
sonable amount "within the scope of actual expenses" incurred by
the suit. All proceeds from a derivative suit filed against a director
are payable only to the corporation. As a result, shareholders are
left with no incentive to file a suit because there is nothing to look
forward to, in terms of financial compensation.
The Final Report recommended boosting incentives for deriva-
tive suit by awarding portions of the proceeds from a legal victory
back to the shareholder filed the suit. But this is not reflected in the
Act.
84 Art. 393(3), newly inserted.
85 Art. 393(4), newly inserted.
86 Art. 405(1), para. 1 amended and para. 2 newly inserted.
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1.6. Enforcing Pre-Emptive Rights:
Each shareholder shall be entitled to the allotment of new
shares in proportion to the number of shares which he
holds.F
Notwithstanding the provision of paragraph (1), the corpo-
ration may, only if it is necessary for the achievement of
managerial objects such as introduction of new technology,
improvement of financial conditions, etc., allot new shares
to a third party other than shareholders under the condi-
tions as set forth in the articles of incorporation.3
Sub-article (1) deletes the phrase "[u]nless otherwise provided
by the articles of incorporation," from the old provision. The old
sub-article (2) has been shifted into the sub-article (3).
These new sub-articles (1) and (2) restrict the allotment of new
shares to a third party to enforce shareholders' pre-emptive rights.
That is permitted only for the achievement of managerial objects.
1.7. Introduction of Exchange and Transfer of Shares for the
Establishment of Holding Company:
Articles 360-2 - 360-22 newly inserted.
1.8. Cumulative Voting Mandatory:
The Final Report recommended making the practice of cumu-
lative voting mandatory. That recommendation was not included
in the Act. Korea established a voluntary cumulative voting sys-
tem in 1998, but few companies have adopted it.0
87 Art. 418(1), amended.
s Art. 418(2), newly inserted.
S9 As of late May 2000, twenty-two percent of KSE listed companies (155 out
of 707) have adopted it. See Ministry of Finance and Economy, Corporate Govern-
ance Improvement Plan for Transparent Management, Oct. 27, 2000, available at
http://www.mofe.go.kr/cgi-pub/content.cgi?code=e-f&no=35 (last visited
Nov. 5, 2001).
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2. Amendment of the Securities Exchange Act9O
The government submitted a draft bill for amendment of the
Securities Exchange Act to the National Assembly on December 21,
2000. The National Assembly passed a modified version on Febru-
ary 28, 2001. Its corporate governance provisions are as follows:
2.1. Recommendation of the Outside Director Candidate:
When the outside director candidate nominating committee
in a KSE listed or KSDA registered company recommends
outside director candidates, it should include among them
the outside director candidate recommended by the share-
holders in the exercise the shareholders' proposal right in
order to exercise rights under art. 191-14.91
This sub-paragraph will be added to art. 54-5(3) and incorporated
by reference to art. 191-16(3). Large KSE listed companies are re-
quired to have nominating committees as will certain KSDA regis-
tered companies. See item 6 below for further discussion.
2.2. Chairman of Audit Committee:
The chairman of the audit committee in a KSE listed or
KSDA registered company should be an outside director.92
This sub-paragraph will be added to article 54-6(2) and incorpo-
rated by reference to article 191-17. Large KSE listed companies
had been required to have audit committees, and this requirement
has been extended to include certain KSDA registered companies
as well.93
90 The Act for the Amendment of the Securities Exchange Act was promul-
gated on March 28, 2001. See Law No. 14762 of Mar. 28, 2001, Gwanbo (S. Korea),
available at http://open.korea.go.kr/gwanbodata/2001/03/0328000000.pdf.
9 Art. 54-6(2), proposed.
92 Art 54-6(2), proposed.
9 See infra Appendix 2.6.
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2.3. Limitation of Voting in the Election of Members of the Audit
Committee:
The provisions of Article 409 (2) and (3) shall apply, mutatis
mutandis, to the election of an outside director who will a
become member of the audit committee. 94
The provisions of Article 54-6(2) through (6) shall apply,
mutatis mutandis, to the composition of the audit committee
of [KSE listed and KSDA registered companies.]9i
As a result, a shareholder who holds more than 3/100 of the
total outstanding shares, exclusive of non-voting shares, may not
exercise his vote with respect to the shares in excess of the above
limit in the election of outside directors who will become members
of the audit committee. The articles of incorporation may provide
for a lower ratio than the limit.
2.4. Strengthening of the Minority Shuareholders' Rigit:
[The thresholds for the right to demand cessation of an
unlawful act and the right to inspect accounting books
will be lowered to one tenth of the old standards. These
thresholds are applicable to a KSE listed or KSDA reg-
istered company and a large securities company.]95
For example, the bill lowered the threshold for the right to de-
mand cessation of an unlawful act from 0.5% to 0.05% in a KSE
listed or KSDA registered company, and from 0.25% to 0.025% in a
large securities company or large business corporation.
94 Art 54-6(6), newly inserted.
95 Art. 191-17(2), amended.
96 Arts. 64(1) & 191-13, amended.
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2.5. Notice and Public Notice of Director Candidate's Name, Etc.:
In case a KSE listed company or KSDA registered company
makes a notice of convocation of a general meeting or a
public notice thereof, and the subject-matter of the meeting
is the appointment of a director, the company shall give,
pursuant to the Commercial Code art. 363(1), a notice or
public notice of the name of the director candidate, a brief
personal record and particulars relating to the candidate as
prescribed by the Presidential Decree.97
In case the above company convenes the general meeting of
shareholders, the company shall give a notice or public no-
tice of:
i) Details of activity such as the percentage of atten-
dance at board of directors meetings of outside director
and other part-time directors, votes for and against the
agenda of board of directors, and particulars of remu-
neration.
ii) Particulars of trading with the largest shareholder,
etc., pursuant to Article 191-19.
iii) The matters for reference relating to the manage-
ment, such as the summary of contents of business, and
the present conditions of management as prescribed by
the Presidential Decree. 9
97 Art. 191-10(2), amended.
98 Art. 191-10(3), newly inserted.
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2.6. Enlargement of Outside Director and Audit Conmittee System
to a KSDA Registered Company:
[Sufficiently large KSDA registered companies prescribed
by the Presidential Decree shall appoint outside directors,
establish an outside director candidate nominating com-
mittee and an audit committee.]99
The outside director and audit committee requirements had ap-
plied only to KSE listed companies.
2.7. Reinforcement of Cumulative Voting:
Shareholders who hold no less than 1/100 of the total out-
standing shares other than non-voting shares in a KSE
listed company or KSDA registered company may request
that the company elect directors by means of cumulative
voting, except as otherwise provided by the articles of in-
corporation.
[Any shareholder who holds more than 3/100 of the total
outstanding shares, exclusive of non-voting shares, may not
exercise his vote with respect to the shares in excess of the
limit, in the change of the articles of incorporation to ex-
clude the cumulative voting or to repeal the clause exclud-
ing the cumulative voting. The articles of incorporation
may provide for a lower ratio than that mentioned above.
The agenda relating to the exclusion or adoption of cumu-
lative voting shall be treated independently from other
agenda relating to the change of articles of incorporation.]1 °
99 Amendment of arts. 191-16 & 191-17, summarized here.
1o0 Art. 191-18, newly inserted and summarized here.
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2.8. Approval of Board of Directors for the Trading With the Largest
Shareholder, Etc.:
A KSE listed company, or KSDA registered company as
prescribed by the Presidential Decree, shall obtain the
approval of the board of directors in order to trade on a
large scale with the largest shareholder and the spe-
cially related person.101
3. Amendments to the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies'02
Finally, there have been a series of recent amendments to the
Act on External Audit of Stock Companies, effective April 1, 2001.
(Law No. 3297). Among others, publicly traded firms (either KSE
or KOSDAQ) are subject to this law and must have their annual fi-
nancial statements audited by certified public accountants. 103 The
recent amendments follow in the wake of the Daewoo collapse.
Korean prosecutors allege false accounting in 1997 and 1998 that
inflated the value of Daewoo's equity by $32 billion.104 The
amendments concern the procedure for the selection of the external
auditor, the procedure for the dismissal of the external auditor, the
public disclosure of violations of accounting standards, and the
term for which the external auditor shall serve. The most impor-
tant of the amendments include the following:
101 Art. 191-19, newly inserted.
102 See Act. No. 6427 of Mar. 28, 2001 (S. Korea) (amending Act No. 6108 of
Jan. 12, 2000) (original version at Act. No. 3297 of Dec. 31, 1980), available at
http://www.klri.re.kr/docs/eng/B3403297.htnl (last modified Aug. 18, 2001);
Law No. 14762 of Mar. 28, 2001, Gwambo (Electronic Gazette) (S. Korea), available
at http://gwanbo.korea.go.kr/www/gwanbodata/2001/03/0328000000.pdf (last
visited Nov. 17,2001).
103 SECURITIES & EXCHANGE Acr, Act No. 6176 of Jan. 21, 2000, art. 194-3(1) (S.
Korea), translated in 22 KoREAN STATt-rEs, supra note 17, at 752 (Supp. 9). The most
recent version of Korea's Securities and Exchange Act can be found at
http://www.moleg.go.kr/mlawinfo/english/htms/html/law19.html (Last vis-
ited Nov. 17, 2001).
104 Moon Ihlwan, Kim's Fall From Grace, Bus. WK., Feb. 19, 2001, at 50.
[22:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss4/1
INDEPENDENCE WITHIN HYUNDAI?
3.1. Approval of the Statuton Auditor or the Auditor Selection
Committee:
In the selection and appointment of an auditor, any com-
pany shall get approval thereof from the statutory auditor
and the Auditor Selection and Appointment Committee se-
cured with its expertise and independence.1 0-3
This amendment is intended to exclude the major shareholder's
influence over the selection of external auditors at the sharehold-
ers' meeting. The approval of the shareholders' meeting is no
longer necessary.
3.2. Prohibition of Conducting an Audit on the Same Company:
An auditor who is an accounting corporation shall not have
the same director perform the audit task for six consecutive
business years [four consecutive business years in case of a
company that is a stock-listed corporation or an Associa-
tion-registered corporation (referring to an Association-
registered corporation under the Securities and Exchange
Act; hereafter the same shall apply)] of a company.Cs
New paragraphs 5 and 6 were added to Article 3. They require
that the accounting corporation's audit team be reconstituted after
three years, if the client is a KSE-listed or KNASDAQ-registered
company.
There was also a set of amendments to the Certified Public Ac-
countant Act, effective April 1, 2001. The most important amend-
ment was the introduction of a civil penalty as a sanction against a
CPA and an accounting firm for false audit work107
105 Art. 4(2), amended.
106 Art. 3(4), amended.
107 Arts. 52-2 - 52-6.
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